The financial walls of the Bank of Ghana (BoG) appear to be closing in, as new evidence suggests the central bank has engaged in what critics are calling a desperate accounting maneuver to hide a catastrophic financial collapse. While Governor Dr. Johnson Asiamah has publicly defended the sale of 50% of the nation’s gold reserves as a strategic “risk management” move, a much darker reality has emerged from the Bank’s own 2025 financial statements.
Governor Asiamah has maintained that holding 40% of Ghana’s total reserves in gold was too risky, arguing that the liquidation of these assets was necessary to bolster international reserves and stabilize the cedi. However, this narrative has been shredded by Dr. Mohammed Amin Adam, the former Finance Minister and Member of Parliament for Karaga, who characterizes the move as a state-sponsored “cover-up” for institutional insolvency.
The True Cost of “Policy Management”
The figures released by the Bank this week present a striking paradox. While the headlines focus on an operating loss of GH¢15.63 billion, analysts have dissected the report to reveal a much heavier burden. According to Dr. Amin Adam and other financial experts, the official net loss reported by the Governor is a sanitized version of the truth, heavily cushioned by the proceeds from the gold sales.
The raw math is telling:
Reported Net Loss: GH¢15.63 billion.
Adjusted Operating Loss: If the GH¢9.7 billion gain from gold sales is removed, the operational deficit surges to roughly GH¢34 billion.
Total Comprehensive Loss: When factoring in the GH¢19.32 billion in “hidden” losses recorded under Other Comprehensive Income (OCI), the total financial damage reaches a staggering GH¢44.5 billion.
Tactical Blunders and Lost Potential
The criticism of Governor Asiamah’s management goes beyond accounting treatments. Dr. Amin Adam has pointed to a major tactical blunder in the timing of these sales. Sources indicate that the Bank rushed to offload gold reserves at approximately $3,500 per ounce, only to watch in frustration as global market prices climbed to $5,200 per ounce just weeks later.
This hurried liquidation, critics argue, cost Ghana billions of dollars in potential profit—wealth that could have been used to solidify the balance sheet without resorting to emergency asset sales. Instead, the Bank found itself in a position where it had to use gold proceeds simply to survive and address its widening negative equity, which has now reached an alarming GH¢93.82 billion.
A Government Under Fire
As the fallout continues, the minority in Parliament has stepped up its attacks on the central bank’s transparency. The presentation of lower figures at official press conferences—as seen in recent days—is being framed by the opposition as a coordinated move to mask the GH¢34.9 billion reality from the public eye.
For the current administration, the defense is thin. Governor Asiamah’s insistence that the move was purely about reserve rebalancing is being challenged by the sheer scale of the losses. With the Bank’s financial stability now inextricably linked to volatile commodity trading and aggressive open-market interventions, the public remains skeptical.
As the political tension builds toward the 2029 election cycle, the debate over these gold reserves is likely to become a central issue. For the government, the pressure is on to prove that these moves were for the benefit of the nation, and not a desperate attempt to keep the doors of the central bank open.
