We may need to take a step back and reflect on how we got here.
The Office of the Special Prosecutor was established in 2017 under the Akufo-Addo administration through the Office of the Special Prosecutor Act, 2017 (Act 959), as part of efforts to strengthen the fight against corruption. At the time, it was widely seen as a necessary reform to improve accountability and restore public confidence.
Today, however, the public debate around the office has become increasingly contentious, with different political actors expressing varying levels of support and criticism.
This raises a deeper question that goes beyond any individual or any current office holder.
What this suggests is that when institutions become subjects of political contestation, their perceived independence can be weakened. That is precisely why we may need to think more boldly about how such offices are constituted and whether a more direct public mandate could strengthen both trust and legitimacy.
We often describe key institutions as independent. Yet many of these institutions are structured in ways where their leadership ultimately originates from the executive.
This is not about questioning the 1992 Constitution of Ghana. It clearly provides for appointment processes that involve the president, consultation, and parliamentary approval, with safeguards for removal.
However, beyond legality lies an equally important issue: public perception and institutional confidence.
Can an institution be fully trusted as independent if its leadership is closely linked, at the point of appointment, to the authority it may be required to scrutinise?
If the goal is to build a truly independent anti-corruption body, then perhaps we must begin to think differently about how such an office is constituted.
In our current political environment, public trust in political actors is not as strong as it should be. That reality matters when we think about institutions that are expected to act independently.
One way to strengthen confidence is to give the public a more direct role in how such offices are constituted.
If the special prosecutor were elected, for example, citizens would feel a sense of ownership in that choice. That participation can translate into greater trust in the decisions of the office, even where those decisions are difficult or unpopular.
At the same time, the governance structure of the office should reflect the same principle of independence.
A more balanced approach could combine:
- A direct public mandate for the Special Prosecutor, with a fixed term of office and clear qualification requirements
- A multi-body selection process for the governing board, involving institutions such as the Judiciary, Parliament, professional bodies, and civil society
- A participatory element, where some members are selected at the regional level to deepen public involvement
These approaches are not mutually exclusive. Together, they create a system where both institutional balance and public participation reinforce each other.
But we must also be clear about what this means.
Moving towards such a model would not be a simple legal adjustment. It would require a fundamental rethink of how prosecutorial authority is structured under the 1992 Constitution of Ghana. It is, therefore, a constitutional question, not just a statutory one.
And if we are not prepared to confront that level of reform, then we must also be realistic about the limits of the system we currently operate.
These are not easy reforms. But if we are serious about building institutions that command public trust, then we must be prepared to examine not just their powers but also how they are designed.
Because, in the end, independence is not only declared but also fought for. It must also be structurally credible.
By: Charles Cromwell Nanabanyin Onuawonto Bissue
