Ghana faces a major refinancing challenge over the next two years, with GH¢111 billion in restructured domestic bonds due for repayment in 2027 and 2028, according to an analysis of the country’s debt maturity profile.

The obligations comprise about GH¢58 billion due in 2027 and GH¢53 billion in 2028, representing bonds issued to banks, pension funds and other investors under the 2022/23 Domestic Debt Exchange Programme (DDEP).

Unlike loans that are repaid gradually, the bonds are structured largely as bullet payments, meaning the principal is due in full on specified settlement dates. That structure has created what the analysis describes as a major “maturity wall”, concentrating a large amount of Ghana’s refinancing needs into a short period.

The figures raise a critical question for government and investors: can Ghana rebuild enough confidence in its domestic bond market to refinance the maturing obligations without another restructuring?

The analysis argues that the immediate problem is not necessarily the absolute size of Ghana’s domestic debt, but the concentration of maturities in 2027 and 2028.

After 2028, annual domestic debt maturities are projected to fall sharply, ranging between about GH¢4.9 billion and GH¢9.3 billion. By comparison, the obligations falling due in 2027 and 2028 are more than six times the largest annual maturity in the subsequent period.

Across the ten years following 2028, the analysis puts total maturities at about GH¢69 billion, compared with GH¢111 billion falling due in just two years.

That difference is at the heart of the refinancing challenge.

A refinancing problem, not simply a repayment problem

The analysis argues that Ghana should not approach the GH¢111 billion obligation as a bill that must be paid entirely from tax revenue.

Instead, it should be treated primarily as a refinancing exercise, in which maturing debt is replaced with new, longer-dated debt as is common in sovereign debt management.

Government has already begun building a Sinking Fund for this purpose. The fund held approximately GH¢15.6 billion as of July 22, 2026, although the amount could have changed following the August 20 coupon payment.

Government has indicated that it is targeting GH¢30 billion by the end of 2026, an amount that the analysis suggests could cover the February 2027 bullet payment.

The challenge becomes more pronounced after that.

The analysis estimates that Ghana could require approximately GH¢25 billion to GH¢30 billion of fresh issuance in each of 2027 and 2028 to deal with the remaining obligations.

That level of borrowing would require a domestic fixed-income market capable of absorbing the debt.

And this is where the problem becomes more complicated.

The bond market remains weak

Although overall turnover on Ghana’s fixed-income market has recovered to levels seen before the debt exchange, the composition of that trading activity has changed significantly.

According to the analysis, Treasury bills and sell-and-buy-back transactions now account for roughly 90 per cent of market volume, while outright trading in government notes and bonds has fallen from approximately 90 per cent of secondary-market activity before the DDEP to less than 10 per cent today.

The distinction matters.

A market can record strong headline turnover without having a healthy market for longer-term government bonds. If investors are primarily trading short-term Treasury bills and collateral transactions, government may still struggle to raise substantial amounts through longer-dated securities.

The experience of the April 2026 seven-year bond illustrates the difficulty.

The issue reportedly attracted GH¢3.1 billion in bids and raised GH¢2.7 billion. While the auction cleared, the analysis argues that the result does not yet demonstrate that Ghana can increase long-term domestic borrowing by the scale required to refinance the 2027 and 2028 maturities.

The issue is therefore one of market depth, investor confidence and liquidity.

A government facing a large refinancing requirement needs investors who are willing to buy bonds, hold them and trade them when necessary. Without that confidence, the state could face sharply higher borrowing costs or insufficient demand at the point when the debt falls due.

Ghana has a window of opportunity

The timing, however, may offer government some room to act.

The analysis points to significant improvements in Ghana’s macroeconomic conditions following the country’s exit from its IMF programme in July 2026.

Inflation, which had risen above 50 per cent at its peak, is now around 5 per cent, according to the document. The policy rate has also fallen by about 1,300 basis points since January 2025, while borrowing costs have declined substantially.

Five-year money is now reported to be clearing below 10 per cent, compared with rates above 30 per cent three years earlier.

The cedi also recorded strong performance in 2025, while the debt-to-GDP ratio has reached the statutory 45 per cent anchor earlier than anticipated.

These developments create conditions that could allow Ghana to return gradually to longer-term domestic borrowing.

But the window may not remain open indefinitely.

The analysis notes that the IMF-supported fiscal framework allows the primary surplus to fall to 0.5 per cent of GDP from 2027, while 2028 will also be an election year. That combination could place additional pressure on fiscal policy precisely when the largest debt obligation comes due.

In other words, the country has a relatively favourable environment today, but the refinancing challenge will become more acute as the maturity dates approach.

The DDEP postponed the problem

The analysis also questions whether the 2022/23 debt exchange fully resolved Ghana’s domestic debt problem.

According to figures attributed to Black Star Analytics, total coupon and principal payments increased from GH¢223.8 billion to GH¢266.5 billion following the restructuring.

Nominal principal reportedly increased from GH¢121.2 billion to GH¢167.7 billion, while the weighted average coupon declined from 18.03 per cent to 15.1 per cent.

The weighted average maturity, however, remained at about six years.

The implication drawn by the analysis is that the DDEP reduced the immediate pressure on government but did not fundamentally eliminate the refinancing challenge.

The structure of the restructured debt means a substantial amount is now concentrated around 2027 and 2028.

The ownership structure of the bonds presents another challenge.

Central Securities Depository data cited in the analysis indicate that 80.3 per cent of DDEP participation came through primary dealers. The Bank of Ghana accounted for 16.5 per cent of the total participation, while custodians representing foreign holders accounted for 15.7 per cent.

The five largest participants were identified as the Bank of Ghana, Standard Chartered acting as custodian for foreign holders, GCB Bank, Ecobank and Consolidated Bank Ghana. Together, they accounted for about 50.3 per cent of participation, while the ten largest participants represented about 73.3 per cent.

The concentration of holdings, combined with accounting treatment and capital considerations, has contributed to what the analysis describes as a market in which much of the restructured paper is effectively locked up.

Why the bond market matters beyond 2028

The argument for rebuilding Ghana’s domestic bond market extends beyond the immediate refinancing challenge.

A functioning bond market provides a benchmark for pricing credit throughout the economy. Government bond yields help banks, insurers and companies determine the cost of longer-term borrowing.

Without reliable three-, five-, seven- and ten-year government yields, other borrowers have less certainty about how to price long-term credit.

The analysis also argues that Ghana should take advantage of the current decline in yields to lock in longer-term financing.

A ten-year bond issued at a favourable rate can protect the government from having to refinance that obligation repeatedly. By contrast, relying heavily on 91-day Treasury bills means returning to the market every few months and accepting whatever rates prevail at the time.

That creates rollover risk.

The same principle applies to infrastructure. Long-lived assets such as hospitals, roads and other public infrastructure should ideally be financed with liabilities that have comparable maturities rather than repeatedly refinancing short-term debt.

A deeper domestic bond market could also help reduce foreign-currency exposure. Cedi-denominated obligations do not increase mechanically when the cedi depreciates, while dollar-denominated debt can become significantly more expensive in local-currency terms during periods of depreciation.

For pension funds and insurers, the availability of long-term government securities is equally important.

The analysis estimates that more than GH¢90 billion in pension assets require suitable long-dated instruments to match long-term obligations to retirees. A market dominated by short-term securities shifts reinvestment risk onto institutional investors and ultimately the people whose savings they manage.

Ten measures proposed

The analysis proposes a series of measures aimed at rebuilding confidence and liquidity before the maturity wall arrives.

First, government should begin voluntary switch auctions for holders of the 2027 and 2028 bonds, offering longer-dated securities in exchange for bonds that mature during the pressure period.

Second, it proposes using the Sinking Fund for open-market buybacks, rather than allowing the fund to remain as idle cash.

Third, the fund should be placed on a statutory footing, with government publishing its balance and sources of funding regularly.

The analysis also recommends a rolling three-year issuance calendar to give investors greater certainty about the government’s borrowing plans.

It proposes establishing five benchmark government bond lines, beginning with three- and five-year maturities, rather than relying heavily on reopening the restructured securities.

Pricing will also be critical. An institutional investor survey cited in the analysis found that 77 per cent of respondents wanted at least 200 basis points above the 364-day Treasury bill rate for new issuance.

The April 2026 seven-year bond, however, cleared at 12.5 per cent against a 364-day Treasury bill that was yielding 12.99 per cent in August, producing what the analysis describes as a negative term premium.

The proposed solution is therefore to price new bonds sufficiently competitively to attract investors while avoiding excessive borrowing costs.

Other proposals include a temporary accounting exemption to make it easier for banks to trade individual bonds without triggering wider portfolio revaluation concerns, reactivating the interbank repo market and requiring primary dealers to provide two-way quotes with defined spreads and minimum trading volumes.

The final priority is to broaden the investor base through measures such as retail government bonds from as little as GH¢100 through mobile money, a diaspora bond, an inflation-linked instrument and a gradual return of foreign investors.

The clock is already running

The central argument is that Ghana cannot afford to wait until 2027 or 2028 before attempting to refinance the maturing debt.

By then, the government would have less negotiating power and investors would have greater leverage over pricing.

The analysis argues that Ghana has roughly 18 months of relatively favourable conditions in which to reduce the size of the maturity wall through voluntary switches and buybacks while simultaneously repairing the market infrastructure needed for bonds to trade efficiently.

If successful, the remaining GH¢25 billion to GH¢30 billion annual refinancing requirement could become a routine part of government borrowing.

If the reforms are delayed, the risk is that Ghana could approach the 2027/2028 maturities with a weak long-term bond market, limited investor appetite and rising fiscal pressure.

That would transform what should be a managed refinancing exercise into another test of sovereign credibility.

The immediate task, therefore, is not simply to find money for bonds that mature in 2027 and 2028. It is to rebuild the market into which those obligations can be refinanced.

The choice is ultimately between acting while financing conditions are favourable or waiting until the maturity wall is close enough for the market to dictate the terms.