When government officials step up to the podium to unpack a fresh statutory document, the public is often treated to a carefully curated selection of victories. Headlines are minted, self-congratulatory speeches are delivered, and complex economic realities are boiled down to simple, politically convenient soundbites.
The release of the 2025 State Ownership Report by the State Interests and Governance Authority (SIGA) has proven to be no exception.
Government communicators were quick to point to the headline figure: a massive turnaround in the State-Owned Enterprise (SOE) sector from a net loss of GHS 2.26 billion in 2024 to a declared net profit of GHS 19.80 billion in 2025. On paper, it sounds like an overnight operational miracle.
Yet, any trained eye reading through the granular data inside the report will quickly discover that the loud celebrations mask a far more complicated reality. When you peel back the layers of accounting adjustments and currency movements, a striking truth emerges. In several crucial balance-sheet metrics, industrial productivity indicators, and public sector sub-groups, the financial performance of 2024—achieved under the disciplined fiscal management of the New Patriotic Party administration—built the very foundation and actually outperformed the metrics recorded in 2025.
There is a side to this official report that government speeches conveniently leave out.
2024 VS 2025 KEY PERFORMANCE OUTLIERS
OSE AGGREGATE FINANCIAL DEFICIT:
2024: GHS 2,404.21 Million (Smaller, contained deficit)
2025: GHS 10,477.78 Million (Exploded by 335.8%)
SOE TOTAL ASSETS VALUE:
2024: GHS 433,247.23 Million (Stronger underlying asset base)
2025: GHS 407,848.64 Million (Contracted by 5.86%)
INDUSTRIAL SECTOR REAL GDP GROWTH:
2024: Stronger relative pace
2025: Constrained at 2.3% (Oil/Gas contraction, flat gold output)
The most glaring detail buried beneath the celebration is the alarming decline of the Other State Entities (OSEs) sub-sector. While public attention was directed toward commercial state enterprises, the health of non-commercial state bodies quietly fell off a cliff.
In FY2024, the total financial deficit for OSEs stood at a contained GHS 2.40 billion. By FY2025, that deficit blew out to a staggering GHS 10.48 billion. That represents a 335.8 per cent deterioration in a single year.
As liabilities for these public entities grew by 21.60 per cent to hit GHS 382.75 billion, outstripping asset growth and pushing the sector into a net liability position, the state’s broader public institutional health took a heavy blow. The 2024 baseline was objectively far more stable and financially sound.
Then comes the question of national balance-sheet strength. A healthy enterprise grows its asset base. Yet the SIGA report confirms that total aggregate assets held by SOEs were higher in FY2024 (GHS 433.25 billion) than in FY2025 (GHS 407.85 billion).
The asset base of state enterprises contracted by nearly 6 per cent in 2025. Much of this shrinkage came from paper revaluations of foreign-currency assets as exchange rates shifted, alongside asset pullbacks in key institutions like COCOBOD and the Volta River Authority. In terms of raw asset backing and structural capital held by state firms, 2024 was a year of greater physical asset weight.
On the real economy side, industrial production numbers tell a similar story of deceleration. Industrial sector Real GDP growth was visibly stronger in FY2024 than the muted 2.3 per cent recorded in FY2025. The 2025 figure felt the burn of a contraction in the oil and gas sub-sector and flat domestic gold production.
The industrial engine that drove broader national growth of 5.8 per cent in 2024 under the NPP was operating with greater internal momentum than the uneven industrial picture seen a year later.
Even on administrative accountability, the numbers reveal interesting details. While 2025 saw an increase in final audited accounts submitted to SIGA, compliance regarding basic employment data submissions actually dropped. 142 entities voluntarily submitted complete employment reporting data in FY2024, compared to 137 entities in FY2025.
So, how did the headline SOE net profit jump so dramatically to GHS 19.80 billion in 2025?
The report itself lays out the mechanics. Over GHS 11.72 billion—nearly 60 per cent of that declared turnaround—did not come from factory-floor productivity, new product lines, or managerial genius. It came directly from net foreign exchange gains and a 42.49 per cent drop in finance costs following macro-monetary adjustments.
Furthermore, major public turnarounds like COCOBOD moving from a GHS 5.73 billion loss to a GHS 5.11 billion profit were built on structural reforms, global market recovery, and debt restructuring frameworks initiated and implemented under the previous NPP government.
When state enterprises claim credit for balance-sheet windfalls, taxpayers must look closely at what generated the money. Accounting relief and currency shifts can create brief spikes in profit, but real institutional strength requires building assets, controlling public agency deficits, and sustaining industrial growth.
The 2025 State Ownership Report contains genuine wins, but it also exposes real vulnerabilities. The NPP’s record of institutional management provided the disciplined foundation, asset base, and structural reforms that made these figures possible.
Public policy requires honest analysis, not selective reading. The facts inside the 2025 SIGA report show that behind the loud victory laps lies a 2024 foundation that was, in many critical areas, far sturdier than what came after.
